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Intertemporal preferences are difficult to measure. We estimate time preferences using a structural
buffer stock consumption model and the Method of Simulated Moments. The model includes stochastic
labor income, liquidity constraints, child and adult dependents, liquid and illiquid assets, revolving
credit, retirement, and discount functions that allow short-run and long-run discount rates to differ.
Data on retirement wealth accumulation, credit card borrowing, and consumption-income comovement
identify the model. Our benchmark estimates imply a 40% short-term annualized discount rate and
a 4.3% long-term annualized discount rate. Almost all specifications reject the restriction to a constant
discount rate. Our quantitative results are sensitive to assumptions about the return on illiquid assets
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion. When we jointly estimate the coefficient of relative risk


















Though intertemporal preferences play a critical role in most important economic decisions, econo-
mists have not identi…ed a reliable method for measuring them (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
2002). The vast majority of research on time preferences has used laboratory studies in which the
experimenter controls the choices that subjects face. Laboratory experiments often ask subjects
to weigh immediate rewards against delayed rewards. A typical study asks subjects if they would
prefer $X now or $Y at a speci…ed future date.
Despite the advantages of controlled laboratory experimentation, such studies may confound
time preferences with other considerations, like the trustworthiness of the experimenter, the abstract
nature of the laboratory task, or the outside investment options of the subject. It is not clear
whether laboratory experiments measure the discount function, market interest rates, curvature of
the utility function, some combination of these factors, or something else entirely.
Research using structural modelling and …eld data has its own strengths and weaknesses. Field
data re‡ect choices from real-world markets and hence have greater external validity than ab-
stract and unfamiliar laboratory decisions. Research with …eld data can also take advantage of
existing large datasets on household behavior. However, …eld data are di¢cult to interpret since
the researcher does not know exactly what tradeo¤s households actually face in the marketplace.
Structural modelling helps to pin down some of these tradeo¤s but such modelling relies on a large
set of explicit and implicit assumptions.
Given all of these considerations, laboratory and …eld research complement each other. Hence
it is surprising that e¤orts to estimate discount rates have primarily used laboratory evidence.1
This imbalance is particularly true of the recent research on generalized time preferences (i.e.,
discount functions that are not restricted to the class of exponential functions). Hundreds of
studies beginning with Chung and Herrnstein (1967) and reviewed in Ainslie (1992) and Frederick
et al. (2002) have estimated generalized discount functions with laboratory evidence while only a
handful have attempted to do this with …eld data.2
1Notable exceptions include Carroll and Samwick (1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Hausman (1979),
Lawrence (1991), Samwick (1998), Viscusi and Moore (1989), and Warner and Pleeter (2001).
2Prominent …eld studies include Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999), Paser-
man (2004), Fang and Silverman (2004), and Shui and Ausubel (2004).
2The current paper contributes to the literature estimating generalized discount functions using
…eld data. We use lifecycle consumption data to estimate time preferences and to formally test the
restriction to exponential discounting. Speci…cally, we use numerical methods to recursively solve
and simulate a structural “bu¤er stock” model of lifecycle consumption and investment choices
(Deaton 1991, Carroll 1992, Carroll 1997). Our model includes a rich array of …nancial instru-
ments, constraints, demographic factors, and stochastic events – e.g., liquid and illiquid assets,
revolving credit, liquidity constraints, household dependents, mortality, retirement, Social Secu-
rity, and stochastic labor income – and thus controls for a number of relevant factors that a¤ect
intertemporal decisions.
We estimate the model’s time preference parameters using a two-stage Method of Simulated
Moments (MSM) procedure (McFadden 1989, Pakes and Pollard 1989, Du¢e and Singleton 1993),
which was …rst used to study lifecycle consumption behavior by Gourinchas and Parker (2002).3
The MSM procedure extends the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to account for numerical
simulation error. In the …rst stage of the MSM procedure we estimate inputs to the life-cycle model,
including the parameters of the stochastic labor income process, interest rates, credit card borrowing
limits, and parameters that describe variation in household size over the lifecycle. In the second
stage of the MSM procedure we use the simulation model to estimate time preference parameters.
These preference parameters are identi…ed by empirical patterns of wealth accumulation, credit
card borrowing, and consumption-income comovement. Uncertainty in estimates of the …rst stage
parameters propagates to the standard errors for the time preference parameters estimated in the
second stage. Formal incorporation of the …rst stage is critical since it raises our second-stage
standard errors by nearly an order of magnitude.
Our analysis has three goals. First, this paper uses …eld data to estimate time preference
parameters for households with a high school degree but not a college degree, comprising 59% of the
US population. We study both the (restricted) exponential discount function and an (unrestricted)
generalization that nests the exponential case. The unrestricted quasi-hyperbolic discount function
3Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and French (2005) use MSM to estimate di¤erent aspects of consumption models.
Gourinchas and Parker identify the exponential discount function and the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion from
lifecycle consumption pro…les. French assesses how the opportunity to save and self-insure a¤ects the impact of
legislated Social Security and Medicare eligibility ages on the retirement decision. Most other applications of MSM
have been in the industrial organization literature.
3allows the discount rate to di¤er in the short-run and the long-run. Second, we formally test the
restricted and unrestricted models, using both t-tests and overidenti…cation tests. Finally, we ask
whether these models accurately predict important empirical regularities in the lifecycle literature.
When we estimate a restricted (exponential) discount function, the MSM procedure estimates
a single annual discount rate of 16.7%.4 By contrast, when we estimate an unrestricted (quasi-
hyperbolic) discount function, the MSM procedure estimates a short-run annualized discount rate of
39.5% and a long-run annualized discount rate of only 4.3%. All of these estimates are statistically
signi…cant at the 1% level. Our estimates also imply a formal rejection of the restricted case: i.e.,
we reject the hypothesis that the short-run discount rate is equal to the long-run discount rate.
Overidenti…cation tests reinforce these conclusions. Only the exponential model is consistently
rejected by overidenti…cation tests. Intuitively, the exponential model cannot simultaneously
explain high levels of credit card borrowing and high levels of retirement wealth accumulation.
By contrast, the quasi-hyperbolic discount function implies that consumers will simultaneously
act patiently and impatiently, because consumers have con‡icting short-run and long-run discount
rates.5 In theory, low long-run discount rates explain why households accumulate substantial
(illiquid) retirement wealth at real interest rates of about 5%, while high short-run discount rates
imply that the same households borrow regularly on credit cards at real interest rates of 12%. By
accumulating wealth in illiquid form, households commit themselves to act patiently in the future
(i.e., not to spend down accumulated assets). However, when liquid assets and unused credit card
balances are available, households spend when they can and therefore appear impatient.
We conclude the paper by reporting a wide range of robustness checks that reinforce some of
our previous …ndings and identify the limits of our results. In 19 of 21 cases we …nd a signi…cant
gap between long-term and short-term discount rates, and in the other two cases we …nd a very
large gap that is swamped by even larger standard errors. Quantitatively, our parameter estimates
and standard errors are robust to many assumptions – e.g., about the persistence of the income
process, the bequest motive, returns to scale within the household, and the credit card interest rate
4By contrast, most authors who calibrate exponential discount functions with lifecycle consumption and wealth
data have adopted discount rates that are around 5% (Engen, Gale and Scholz 1994, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
1994, Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 1998, Engen, Gale and Uccello 1999). Our results di¤er because we ask our
model to simultaneously …t wealth accumulation data and credit card borrowing data.
5See Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001) and Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003).
These predictions rely in part on consumers’ access to illiquid assets for long-run saving.
4– but sensitive to assumptions about the return on illiquid assets and the coe¢cient of relative risk
aversion.
We go further toward understanding the role of the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion by
estimating it simultaneously with the discounting parameters. The MSM procedure results in
estimates of the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion between 0.2 and 0.3 in both the exponential
and quasi-hyperbolic cases. In the exponential case, the estimated discount rate falls, and the
risk aversion coe¢cient is not well identi…ed. In the quasi-hyperbolic case, the short-term and
long-term discount rates also fall but continue to di¤er statistically, and all three parameters are
estimated precisely.
This paper’s …ndings are consistent with the results in other papers that have estimated quasi-
hyperbolic time preference parameters with structural models and …eld data. Paserman (2004)
obtains identi…cation from heterogeneity in unemployment durations and reservation wages to …nd
estimates of the short-run annualized discount rate that range from 11% to 91% and a long-run
discount rate of only 0.1%. He rejects the exponential discounting null hypothesis for two of three
subsamples. Fang and Silverman (2004) estimate models of both “sophisticated” and “naive”
quasi-hyperbolic discounting.6 Using data on welfare recipients, they …nd in the sophisticated case
a short-run discount rate of 108% and a long-run discount rate of 13%, and they reject the null
hypothesis of exponential discounting. Their results in the naive case are very similar. Finally,
Shui and Ausubel (2004) use data from a direct mail credit card interest rate experiment to estimate
the parameters of sophisticated and naive quasi-hyperbolic models. They obtain short-run discount
rates of 24% in the sophisticated case and 20% in the naive case. In both cases they …nd a long-term
discount rate of 0.01% and they reject the exponential discounting null hypothesis.
The empirical data we use to estimate our model are presented in Section 2. Section 3 sum-
marizes the structural model that we use. We explain the MSM procedure in Section 4. Section
5 presents our results. Section 6 discusses extensions and Section 7 concludes.
6Naive hyperbolic decision-makers incorrectly believe that they will have exponential discount functions in the
future, while hyperbolics who are aware that they will be hyperbolic in the future are called “sophisticates.” See
Akerlof (1991) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b) for analysis of naive hyperbolic discounters. In most
consumption models sophisticates and naifs behave similarly (Angeletos et al. 2001). We focus on the sophisticated
case. See Section 6 for more discussion.
52 Wealth Accumulation, Credit Card Borrowing, and Consumption-
Income Comovement Data
We estimate exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discount functions by matching moments that char-
acterize wealth accumulation, credit card borrowing, and excess sensitivity of consumption to pre-
dictable movements in income. We summarize these statistics in this section. Table 1 reports
these moments, and Appendix A contains a detailed description of the data sources and estimation
procedures. All of the analysis that we conduct applies only to U.S. households whose head has
a high school degree but not a college degree. These households constitute 59% of the population
(U.S. Census Bureau 1995).7
The …rst statistic, % V isa, is the fraction of households that borrow on credit cards.8 Our
analysis …nds that 67.8% of households pay interest on credit card debt in any given month.
Speci…cally, % V isa represents the fraction of households that self-report that they did not pay
their bill in full at the end of the last month (SCF 1995 and 1998). Though there is considerable
heterogeneity among households, credit card borrowing is ubiquitous across the entire distribution
of wealth. Table 2 of Laibson et al. (2003) reports the fraction of households borrowing on credit
cards by age and by wealth quartile.9 Among households with a head between ages 20-29 that are
in the top wealth quartile for their age group, three-fourths did not repay their credit card bills in
full the last time they paid their bills. For households with a head in his or her thirties, over 80%
of median wealth-holders had credit card debt. Even among the households with a head between
ages 50-59 that are between the 50th and 75th wealth percentiles, 56% borrowed and paid interest
on credit card debt in the past month. The typical American household accumulates wealth in the
years leading up to retirement and simultaneously borrows on their credit cards.
We construct the second statistic, mean V isa; by dividing credit card borrowing by mean age-
speci…c income.10 We then average this fraction over the lifecycle. The average household has
7Laibson et al. (1998, 2003) examine households in all education categories using a calibration framework instead
of an estimation framework. They …nd qualitatively similar results across education categories.
8This is the fraction that borrows on any type of card, not just Visa cards.
9Note however that the lifecycle patterns in this table are di¢cult to interpret because they re‡ect both cohort
e¤ects and age e¤ects.
10Throughout the paper we exclude households reporting less than $1000 in annual income. Since our income
measure includes government and inter-household transfers, we view income less than $1000 as having a high chance
of re‡ecting mismeasurement.
6outstanding credit card debt equal to 11.7% of the mean income of its age cohort (SCF and Federal
Reserve Board, 1995 and 1998). This statistic is e¤ectively a ratio of means. We use the ratio of
means instead of the mean ratio, since household level income can take small values.
The third statistic, CY , represents the excess sensitivity of consumption in response to pre-
dictable income changes.11 We estimate that the marginal propensity to consume is 23% of the
expected income change (PSID 1978-1992). This …gure is consistent with other analyses in the
literature.12
The …nal statistic, wealth, is a weighted average of wealth-to-income ratios across households
with heads aged 50-59, excluding ‘involuntary’ wealth like Social Security and other de…ned bene…t
pensions. We restrict attention to households aged 50-59 so that we are primarily measuring
retirement savings. We also weight the wealth-to-income ratios with a scaled arctan function to
downweight (positive and negative) outliers in wealth and to simultaneously prevent low values in
income from causing the statistic to blow up.13 The resulting wealth measure equals 2:60 (SCF
1983-1998). For comparison, the median wealth-to-income ratio for the same sub-sample is 2.16.14
3 Consumption-Savings Model
Our work extends the numerical simulation literature pioneered by Carroll (1992, 1997), Deaton
(1991), Zeldes (1989), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994,
1995). Our speci…c analysis is most closely related to Gourinchas and Parker (2002) — we adopt
their MSM procedure — and Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003) — we adopt their calibrated
structural model. In the next section we review the Gourinchas and Parker MSM procedure. In
the current section we review the Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman model.
The parameters for this structural model can be found in Table 2. In the model, economic de-
11See for example Carroll and Summers (1991), Shea (1995), and Parker (1999).
12Most previous work on excess sensitivity has found coe¢cients between 0 and 0.5. See Deaton (1992) and
Browning and Lusardi (1996) for reviews.
13The smoothness of arctan (in contrast to, say, the median) implies requisite di¤erentiability of the theoretical
moment conditions. Our results are robust to di¤erent choices of this transformation. See Appendix A for details
on the scaling.
14We could not use an easy-to-interpret ratio of means to construct the wealth moment (as we did for mean V isa)
because wealth is so strongly skewed to the right. For instance, the ratio of mean to median is six times greater for
wealth than for income (SCF, 1998): (mean income)/(median income) = 1.9; (mean wealth)/(median wealth) =
11.8.
7cision making begins at age 20. Households have an age-dependent survival hazard of st calibrated
with data from the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (1994). Household composition
varies deterministically with age as children and adult dependents enter and leave the household.15
E¤ective household size nt equals the number of spouses – which we assume to be two in our bench-
mark model – plus the number of dependent adults, plus 0.4 times the number of children under
18. In our benchmark analysis we assume that the spouses die simultaneously, but we relax this
assumption in Section 5.3.3 of our robustness analysis, where we also analyze di¤erent assumptions
for the returns to scale in household consumption.
Let Yt represent period t after-tax income from transfers and wages, including labor income,
inheritances, private de…ned bene…t pensions, and government transfers including Social Security.
During working life yt = ln(Yt) is modelled as the sum of a cubic polynomial in age, an AR(1), and
an iid shock. We approximate the AR(1) with a Markov process, and denote the Markov state ￿:
During retirement, yt is the sum of a linear polynomial in age and an iid shock. Retirement occurs
exogenously at age T. The income process and the retirement age are calibrated from the PSID.16
Let Xt represent liquid asset holdings at the beginning of period t before receipt of Yt. If Xt < 0
then uncollateralized debt — i.e. credit card debt — was held between t ￿ 1 and t. Households
face a credit limit at age t of ￿ times average income at age t, i.e., Xt ￿ ￿￿Y t.17 The model
precludes consumers from simultaneously holding liquid assets and credit card debt, though such
potentially suboptimal behavior has been documented among a subpopulation of consumers by
Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Bertaut and Haliassos (2001).
Positive liquid asset holdings earn a risk-free real after-tax gross interest rate of R; the average
of Moody’s AAA municipal bond yields from 1980-2000 (Gourinchas and Parker 2002). Households
pay a gross “e¤ective” real interest rate on credit-card borrowing of RCC. We refer to this simply
as the credit card interest rate, but our estimate of RCC captures the impact of bankruptcy and
15The demographic pro…les are estimated parametrically using the PSID.
16Some authors, such as Hubbard et al. (1994), …nd very similar parameter values. Other authors estimate more
persistent income shocks than we …nd. Finally, some papers estimate non-stationary processes. Overidenti…cation
tests fail to reject our results, and the discounting estimates we report below are robust to increasing the persistence
of the income process. See Appendix Table 1.
17The limit is estimated from the SCF. This is a crude representation of the income-based credit limits that are
common in the revolving credit market. Assets are not an important determinant of credit card borrowing limits
because large asset classes like retirement accounts (and in some states home equity) can not be seized after a credit
card default.
8in‡ation, which lower consumers’ e¤ective interest payments.18
Let Zt represent (net) illiquid asset holdings at the beginning of period t, with Zt ￿ 0;8t: Illiquid
assets include durables, which generate two types of returns: capital gains and consumption ‡ows.
For computational tractability, capital gains equal zero (i.e., RZ = 1) and the annual consumption
‡ow is ￿Zt = 0:05 ￿ Zt. Hence, the return from holding the illiquid asset is a 5% annual ‡ow of
consumption. We also adopt the assumption that Z can only rise during the owner’s lifetime; i.e.,
transaction costs are large enough that the Z asset is never sold until wealth is bequeathed to the
next generation. These choices about Z do not match the properties of a particular illiquid asset
though Z has some of the features of home equity.19
Four observations motivate these assumptions about Z. First, despite increasing …nancial
sophistication many household assets continue to be partially illiquid and were certainly illiquid
during our sample period (1978 to 1998). Accessing equity in homes, cars and retirement plans like
401(k)s entails at least small transactions costs and delays. Second, theory (Laibson 1997) and
simulations (Laibson et al. 2003) have shown that for the quasi-hyperbolic case, small transactions
costs have the same impact on consumers as complete illiquidity. Third, illiquidity of Z mimics
the optimal savings mechanisms that have recently been derived for quasi-hyperbolic consumers
(Amador, Werning and Angeletos 2004). Finally, assuming that Z is illiquid increases computa-
tional tractability by limiting the choice set of the consumer. In Subsection 5.3 we evaluate the
robustness of our set-up by making Z more attractive, and we highlight the potential drawbacks
of assuming that Z is illiquid when we discuss extensions of the model in Subsection 6.4.
18Speci…cally, from the quarterly interest rates reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s G-19 historical series,
we subtract the CPI-U and the bankruptcy rate. We calculate the latter by dividing the number of bankruptcies
(American Bankruptcy Institute) by the number of US households that have credit cards (SCF). This attributes all
US bankruptcies to households holding credit cards.
These calculations omit two considerations that would further lower the e¤ective credit card rate. First, without
declaring bankruptcy, households might be able to default on their credit card debt. Second, consumption may be
unusually low in the bankruptcy/default state, which reduces the cost of borrowing since repayment only occurs in
“good states.” On the other hand, we also omitted two bankruptcy-related considerations that raise the e¤ective
credit card rate. The model does not account for the stigma associated with bankruptcy (Gross and Souleles 2002b)
or for the cost of future exclusion from credit markets. Robustness checks — using a wide range of credit card
interest rates — are provided in section 5.3.
19Consider a consumer who owns a house of …xed real value H and derives annual consumption ‡ows from the house
of ￿H: Suppose the consumer has a mortgage of size M and home equity of H ￿M: The real cost of the mortgage is
￿M; where ￿ = i￿(1￿￿)￿￿ is the nominal mortgage interest rate adjusted for in‡ation and the tax deductibility of
interest payments. If we assume ￿ ￿ ￿, the net bene…t to the homeowner is ￿H ￿ ￿M ￿ ￿(H ￿ M) = ￿Z: Section
6 discusses enriching the modelling of Z.
9Let IX
t represent net investment into the liquid asset X during period t, and let IZ
t represent
net investment into the illiquid asset Z during period t. Then the dynamic budget constraints are
given by,










Since the interest rate on liquid wealth RX depends on whether the consumer is borrowing or saving





RCC if Xt + IX
t < 0
R if Xt + IX
t ￿ 0
Denote rCC = RCC ￿ 1. The static budget constraint is:
Ct = Yt ￿ IX
t ￿ IZ
t
The state variables ￿t at the beginning of period are age (t), liquid wealth (Xt+Yt), illiquid wealth
(Zt), and the value of the Markov process (￿t): The non-redundant choice variables are IX
t and IZ
t .
Consumption is calculated as a residual.
The consumer has constant relative risk aversion and a quasi-hyperbolic discount function. For
t 2 f20;21;:::;90g; self t has instantaneous payo¤ function
















[st+i ￿ u(Ct+i;Zt+i;nt+i) + (1 ￿ st+i) ￿ B(Xt+i;Zt+i)]:
Here ￿ is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, and B(￿) represents the payo¤ in the death state,
which incorporates a bequest motive.20 The …rst expression in the bracketed term is the utility
20Liquidated bequeathed wealth is consumed by heirs as an annuity (Laibson et al. 2003). Speci…cally, if ￿ n
10‡ow that arises in period t + i if the household survives to age t + i: The second expression is
the termination payo¤ in period t + i which arises if the household dies between period t + i ￿ 1




corresponds to a short-run
discount rate of ￿ln(￿￿) and a long-run discount rate of ￿ln(￿):21 When ￿ = 1 the consumer
has exponential discounting, which implies that the agent is dynamically consistent.
Following Strotz (1955) we model behavior as an intra-personal game among selves f20;21;:::;90g.
Taking the strategies of other selves as given, self t picks a strategy at time t: This strategy is a




is a …xed point in the strategy space, such that all strategies are optimal given the strategies of
other players. We solve for equilibrium strategies using numerical backwards induction.
Let Vt;t+1 (￿t+1) represent the time t + 1 continuation payo¤ function of self t. Then self t’s
objective function is




in state ￿t to maximize this expression. The sequence of continuation
payo¤ functions is de…ned recursively
Vt￿1;t(￿t) = st[u(Ct;Zt;nt) + ￿EtVt;t+1(￿t+1)] + (1 ￿ st)EtB(￿t): (4)
The induction continues in this way.
We generate Js = 5000 independent streams of income realizations for Js households. Then we
simulate lifecycle choices for these households, assuming they make equilibrium decisions conditional
on their state variables. From the simulated pro…les of C; X; Z; and Y , we calculate the moments
used in the MSM estimation procedure. Note that the simulated pro…les, and hence the summary
is average e¤ective household size over the life-cycle, ￿ y is average labor income over the life-cycle, and u1 (￿ y;0; ￿ n)
is the partial derivative of instantaneous utility u(C;Z;n) with respect to consumption, we assume, B(X;Z) =








1￿￿ : Often liquiditating bequeathed wealth entails large transactions costs, so we
multiply bequeathed illiquid wealth by two-thirds. The rest of the expression follows because the total consumption
of the bequest recipient approximately equals ￿ y; and on average the e¤ective household size of the bequest recipient
equals ￿ n.
This formulation is consistent with both common assumptions in the literature on bequests: it is a parametrization
of an altruistic bequest motive which also assumes a “warm-glow”-style payo¤ linear in the size of the bequest.
Adjusting the bequest payo¤ by 25% has a trivial impact on our parameter estimates. See Appendix Table 1.
21See Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997).
11moments, depend on the parameters of the model. Since the model cannot be solved analytically,
its quantitative predictions are derived from the simulated lifecycle pro…les. Variability arising
from (…nite sample) simulation error is addressed in the estimation procedure.
4 Method of Simulated Moments Procedure
We estimate the parameters of the model’s discount function in the second stage of a Method
of Simulated Moments procedure, closely following the methodology of Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). MSM allows us to evaluate the predictions of our model, to formally test the nested null
hypothesis of exponential discounting, ￿ = 1; and to perform speci…cation tests. We use MSM
rather than GMM because the model cannot be solved analytically.22 The current section describes
our procedure. Appendix B presents derivations and some technical details.
Our MSM procedure has two stages. In the …rst stage, nuisance parameters, ￿, are estimated
using standard GMM techniques (see Table 2). We take these N￿ = 28 estimated parameters and
their associated variances, ￿￿, from Laibson et al. (2003).23 Some authors describe this …rst-stage
as the “calibration” stage. These …rst-stage estimates match those of numerous other researchers.24
Given ^ ￿ and ￿￿; the second stage uses additional data and more of the model’s structure
to estimate N￿ additional parameters ￿.25 The second stage, taking the …rst stage parameters
…xed at ^ ￿; chooses ￿ to minimize the distance between the empirical and the simulated moments.
22See McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989), and Du¢e and Singleton (1993) for the …rst formulations of
MSM, and Stern (1997) for a review of simulation-based estimation techniques.
23Included in ￿ are seven pre-retirement income level coe¢cients, three pre-retirement income variability coe¢-
cients, the retirement age, …ve post-retirement income coe¢cients, one post-retirement income variability coe¢cient,
six e¤ective household size coe¢cients, the credit limit, the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, and three interest
rates.
24Hubbard et al. (1994) report an almost identical process for after-tax non-asset income. Attanasio and Weber
(1995) report similar family size pro…les over the life cycle. Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) provide similar
estimates of the retirement age and income replacement rates. Ausubel (1991) reports credit card interest rates that
are similar to our estimates before we correct for personal bankruptcy.
25In principle ￿ and ￿ could be estimated simultaneously. In practice, computational considerations led us to adopt
the two stage estimator, which has already been successfully employed in the household …nance literature (Gourinchas
and Parker 2002). The consistency of our (second stage) ￿ estimator depends on strong exogeneity assumptions. For
example, if labor supply were instead endogenously chosen, then households could insure idiosyncratic shocks by
working more hours or postponing retirement. Introducing such features into the model would make credit card
borrowing more puzzling, since endogenous labor supply could be used instead of credit card borrowing to smooth
consumption during transitory periods of low wages. Hence, we conjecture that our assumption of exogenous labor
supply is biasing up our estimates of ￿: However, our exogeneity assumptions may induce other o¤setting biases,
and their overall e¤ect on the estimates of ￿ is unclear.
12Speci…cally, we use the data from Section 2 on wealth accumulation, credit card borrowing, and
excess sensitivity to estimate ￿ = (￿;￿) in the second stage. MSM di¤ers from a calibration exercise
followed by a one-stage estimation in that it propagates uncertainty in the …rst stage parameters
into the standard errors of the second stage parameter estimates. In other words ￿￿; the variance
matrix of ^ ￿; depends on ￿￿:26 For three of the model’s parameters that are not pinned down
precisely by available data, rCC, ￿, and ￿, we perform additional robustness checks in Subsection
5.3.
Denote the empirical vector of Nm second stage aggregate moments by ￿ mJm: Let Jm be the
numbers of empirical observations used to calculate the elements of ￿ mJm:27 Denote the theoret-
ical population analogue to ￿ mJm by m(￿;￿) and let mJs (￿;￿) be the simulation approximation
to m(￿;￿). Let g (￿;￿) ￿ [m(￿;￿) ￿ ￿ mJm] and gJs (￿;￿) ￿ [mJs (￿;￿) ￿ ￿ mJm]: The moment
conditions imply that in expectation
Eg (￿0;￿0) = E [m(￿0;￿0) ￿ ￿ mJm] = 0;
where (￿0;￿0) is the true parameter vector. De…ne derivatives of the moment functions with
respect to the parameters by G￿ ￿
@g(￿0;￿0)
@￿ and G￿ ￿
@g(￿0;￿0)
@￿ : Let ￿g be the variance-covariance





variance of the second stage moment estimates ￿ mJm; which is estimated directly and consistently
from sample data.28
Let W be a positive de…nite NmxNm weighting matrix. De…ne
q (￿;￿) ￿ gJs (￿;￿) ￿ W￿1 ￿ gJs (￿;￿)
0 (5)
26Our derivation of ￿￿ assumes that the …rst-stage moments and the second-stage moments have uncorrelated
measurement error. We made this simplifying assumption because most of the data we use to identify ￿ and ￿ come
from separate datasets. Exceptions are the credit limit and CY: However, even household level covariances between
the second stage moments and the credit limit are approximately zero. Moreover, CY ’s large standard error means
that it is has little weight in our second-stage estimation anyway – our results do not qualitatively change when we
omit CY from the list of moments.
27Though the main text does not discuss it, the procedure accounts for the fact that Jm di¤ers for di¤erent moments.
Appendix B contains details.
28If the same number of empirical observations ￿ Jm were available to calculate all of the second stage moments,
then we would have ￿g = ￿g= ￿ Jm:
13as a scalar-valued loss function, equal to the weighted sum of squared deviations of simulated
moments from their corresponding empirical values. Then our procedure is to …x ￿ at the value of
its consistent …rst-stage estimator, minimize the loss function q (￿; ^ ￿) with respect to ￿, and de…ne
the estimator as29
^ ￿ = arg min
￿
q (￿; ^ ￿): (6)
Pakes and Pollard (1989) demonstrate that under regularity conditions satis…ed here ^ ￿ is a consistent
estimator of ￿0; and ^ ￿ is asymptotically normally distributed. As shown in Appendix B,






















Js ￿g is the simulation correction.
This equation is used to calculate standard errors for our estimates of ￿: All derivatives are
replaced with consistent numerical analogues, which we calculate using the model and simulation
procedure.30 We estimate ￿g and ￿￿ consistently from sample data. After obtaining estimates
using the weighting matrix W = ￿￿1





￿￿1 : Many authors (Altonji and Segal 1996, West, Wong and Anatolyev 2004,
for example) have found optimally-weighted GMM procedures lead to biased estimates in small
samples, so our baseline estimates use the simple weighting matrix W = ￿￿1
g : In robustness checks
we …nd that our qualitative conclusions are not a¤ected by adoption of either of these weighting
matrices.
To interpret the expression for ￿￿; …rst consider the simulation correction ￿s
g: As the size of
the simulated population Js relative to the size of the sample Jm goes to in…nity, the simulation
correction approaches zero. Intuitively, as the simulation becomes an ideal approximation for the
true population, the simulation correction disappears. Next examine the …rst stage correction
G￿￿￿G0
￿. This correction increases with the uncertainty ￿￿ in our estimates of the …rst-stage pa-
rameters; note that ￿￿ itself is increasing in the underlying population variance of ￿ and decreasing
29We perform this minimization with Matlab’s Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm. This algorithm is slower but
more robust than derivative-based methods, and here it is preferred because of the nonconvexities in quasi-hyperbolic
policy functions.
30We take numerical derivatives on both sides of the optimum and accept the derivative that has the most conser-
vative implications for ￿￿.
14in the number of observations we use to estimate ￿: The …rst-stage correction also increases with
the sensitivity of the second-stage moments to changes in the …rst-stage parameters.











In the benchmark case where we assume W = ￿￿1







MSM also allows us to perform speci…cation tests. If the model is correct,
￿
￿




^ ￿; ^ ￿
￿
￿ Wopt ￿ g0
Js
￿














^ ￿; ^ ￿
￿
will have a chi-squared distribution with Nm ￿ N￿ degrees of freedom. This test statistic equals
q
￿
^ ￿; ^ ￿
￿
in the optimal-weighting case.
5 Results
In this section we discuss the paper’s three sets of …ndings. We report estimates for the discount
factors ￿ and ￿, including the special case in which we impose ￿ = 1 (leaving ￿ as the only free
parameter). Second, we evaluate the statistical …t of the estimated models, using both t-tests and
overidenti…cation tests. Finally, we ask whether these models accurately predict key empirical
regularities in the lifecycle literature.
The coe¢cient of relative risk aversion ￿, the return on illiquid assets ￿; and the credit card
interest rate rCC a¤ect the quantitative results and these parameters are di¢cult to pin down
empirically. As benchmarks we adopt the assumptions ￿ = 5%; rCC = 11:52%; and ￿ = 2; but
we also examine the robustness of our …ndings to changes in these parameters in subsection 5.3,
including the simultaneous estimation of ￿, ￿ and ￿. We also discuss the sensitivity of our results
to alternative assumptions on the returns to scale in household consumption and on household
15mortality.31 Unless otherwise speci…ed we study estimates based on the robust weighting matrix
W = ￿￿1
g ; but we include some representative results using the e¢cient weighting matrix.
5.1 Identi…cation
Identi…cation of ￿ and ￿ depends on the way the simulated moments mJs (￿; ^ ￿) vary as functions
of ￿ and ￿: In our case the pre-retirement weighted wealth-to-income ratio, wealth; increases in
both ￿ and ￿: All of the other moments decrease in ￿ and ￿: Hence, ￿ and ￿ are substitutes.
Nevertheless, the model is identi…ed since ￿ and ￿ are not perfect substitutes.
Identi…cation of ￿ and ￿ can be visualized in Figure 1, which plots q (￿; ^ ￿): Recall that q
is a weighted sum of squared deviations of the simulated moments from their empirical analogs.
Smaller values of q re‡ect a closer …t between the simulated model and the data. In Figure 1, q
resembles an upward-opening paraboloid. Intermediate values of ￿ and ￿ — neither zero nor one
— minimize the distance between the simulated moments and the empirical moments.
Figure 1 exhibits an extended valley in the plot of q; traversing from high ￿ and low ￿ to low
￿ and high ￿: The orientation of this valley implies that ￿ and ￿ are partial substitutes; when ￿
is high, low values of ￿ best match the empirical facts, and vice-versa. If the valley had a ‡at
bottom, ￿ and ￿ would be perfect substitutes and the model would not be identi…ed.
The lowest point in the valley is (￿;￿) = (0:703; 0:958); and the paraboloid rises steeply as
￿ rises. As ￿ approaches 1 the model does very poorly; near ￿ = 1; matching credit card data
requires a low value of ￿ (e.g., ￿ ￿ 0:85); but with ￿ this low, wealth accumulation vanishes. Figure
2 displays a higher-resolution plot, which highlights the fact that the model cannot match the data
when ￿ is close to 1.
The …gures re‡ect the intuition that low long-term discount rates are necessary to match ob-
served levels of retirement wealth. A household will only accumulate illiquid wealth that has a
return of about 5% if the household’s long-term discount rate is not much greater than 5%. If the
long-term discount rate is pinned down in this way, it is necessary to have a ￿ value below one to
match the data on credit card borrowing.
31Appendix Table 1 reports the results of adjusting the bequest payo¤ and of increasing the persistence of income
shocks.
165.2 Benchmark Estimates
We report our benchmark estimates in Table 3. In the unconstrained case (Column 1) the MSM
procedure yields an estimate of ^ ￿ = 0:703; with a standard error (s.e.(i) in the Table) of 0.109.
For this speci…cation ^ ￿ lies signi…cantly below 1; the t-stat for the ￿ = 1 hypothesis test is t =
1￿0:703
0:109 = 2:72: The MSM procedure yields an estimate of ^ ￿ = 0:958; with a standard error of 0.007.
The estimated values of ￿ and ￿ imply a short-run discount rate of ￿ln(0:703￿0:958) = 39:5% and
a long-run discount rate of ￿ln(0:958) = 4:3%.
At the estimated parameter values, the quasi-hyperbolic model generates the moment predic-
tions reported in Column 1 of the lower panel of Table 3. We can compare these simulated moments
with the sample moments ￿ mJm; which are reproduced in Column 5. Qualitatively, the model pre-
dicts both active borrowing on credit cards and accumulation of midlife wealth. Quantitatively,
the model predicts a fraction borrowing three standard errors from the sample value, a level of
borrowing that di¤ers by …ve standard errors, and a consumption-income comovement coe¢cient
and measure of wealth accumulation that are both o¤ by about one standard error. However, such
comparisons do not account for uncertainty in the …rst-stage parameters of the model. Once this
uncertainty is propagated through the estimation procedure — which is what MSM does — the
model is consistent with the data. The (inverse) goodness-of-…t measure ￿
￿
^ ￿; ^ ￿
￿
= 3:01 compares
favorably to the 5% critical value of 5.99 for a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom.
For the benchmark case, we fail to reject the overidenti…cation test.
We also estimate ￿ alone, imposing the restriction ￿ = 1. This exponential discounting case
yields the results in Column 2. We …nd ^ ￿ = 0:846 – implying a discount rate of 16.7% – and a
standard error of 0.025. At these point estimates, the empirical facts about credit card borrow-
ing and excess sensitivity are matched well. However, with such a high discount rate the model
cannot account for observed wealth data. Instead, it predicts wealth = ￿0:05; wealth loses in
the tug of war between …tting wealth; which requires a low discount rate, and …tting the credit
card variables % V isa and mean V isa, which requires a high discount rate.32 The best …t avail-
32The empirical value of wealth is 2:6, twenty standard errors from its simulated value of wealth
￿
^ ￿; ^ ￿
￿
= ￿0:05:
However, matching the empirical value of wealth would require % V isa to approach 0, forty standard errors from
its empirical value. If the returns to illiquid wealth (i.e., ￿) were high enough, an exponential model could more
successfully match the facts simultaneously. The results from Case B in Subsection 5.3.4 provide suggestive evidence.
17able under an exponential model predicts that typical households have negative total assets in
their peak accumulation years. Goodness of …t naturally su¤ers: ￿ (￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:846; ^ ￿) = 217 ￿
3:01 = ￿ (￿ = 0:703; ￿ = 0:958; ^ ￿): With the exponential restriction we estimate only one pa-
rameter, but ￿ (￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:846; ^ ￿) compares unfavorably to even the 1% critical value of 11.34
for a chi-squared distribution with three degrees of freedom. Recall that above we compared
￿ (￿ = 0:703; ￿ = 0:958; ^ ￿) to a chi-squared distribution with only two degrees of freedom. This
di¤erence accounts for the degree of improvement in goodness-of-…t possible merely by adding a free
parameter. The p-value represents the smallest signi…cance level at which the benchmark model
would be rejected, so the overidenti…cation test rejects the exponential model at the 1% level. The
p-value for the unconstrained model exceeds the p-value for the constrained model by many orders
of magnitude.
The standard errors reported as “s.e.(i)” in Table 3 incorporate corrections for the …rst stage
estimation and for the simulation error. For comparison, we also report standard errors without
these corrections: s.e.(ii) only includes the …rst stage correction, s.e.(iii) only includes the simulation
correction, and s.e.(iv) includes neither.
Comparing s.e. (i) and (ii) reveals that if the simulation were in…nitely large, so that the
simulation exactly captured the properties of the theoretical population, the standard error on ￿
would barely change – falling from 0.1093 to 0.1090. However, the standard errors are dramatically
a¤ected by the …rst stage correction. Comparing s.e. (i) and (iii), if the …rst stage parameters
were known with certainty the standard error on ￿ would shrink by a factor of six – falling from
0.1093 to 0.0170.
Using the optimal weighting matrix largely preserves the pattern of the benchmark results.
Our optimal-weights …ndings are reported in Columns 3 and 4. The quasi-hyperbolic results with
the optimal weighting matrix are similar to those with W = ￿￿1
g : The estimated ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ are
slightly higher, the standard error on ^ ￿ is lower, and the standard error on ^ ￿ is higher. In the
exponential case, ^ ￿ is found to be substantially larger than in the benchmark; now ^ ￿ is selected
by the estimation procedure to match the data on wealth at the expense of matching the facts on
borrowing and excess sensitivity.
Uncertainty in all of the …rst stage parameters except ￿; rCC; and ￿ has been incorporated into
18the standard errors reported above.33 However, ￿; rCC; and ￿ are di¢cult to pin down empirically.
In the next subsection we explore the robustness of our …ndings to changes in those parameters
and other components of the model.
5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Interest Rate Perturbations
We perturb the return on the illiquid asset (￿) and the credit card interest rate (rCC) one-by-one
from their benchmark values (i.e., ￿ = 5% and rCC = 11:52%). We report the resulting estimates
of ￿ and ￿ in Columns 2-5 of Table 4A.
In Column 1 we reproduce the benchmark results as a reference. In Column 2 we set ￿ = 3:38%;
corresponding to the average tax- and in‡ation-adjusted mortgage interest rate from 1980-2000, as
calculated from Freddie Mac’s historical series of nominal mortgage interest rates and the CPI-U,
assuming a marginal tax rate of 25%. Intuitively, this choice for ￿ re‡ects the interest savings
resulting from paying o¤ a dollar of mortgage debt. We interpret 3.38% as being at the low end of
a range of possible assumptions about returns to the illiquid asset Z: In Column 2 we estimate a
lower ^ ￿ and a higher ^ ￿ than in the benchmark case. Intuitively, when the return on the illiquid
asset is relatively low, consumers will only invest in the illiquid asset if they have a low long-run
discount rate. Lowering the long-run discount rate makes the consumer more patient generally,
so the MSM procedure generates a greater short-run discount rate (i.e., a lower value of ￿) to
o¤set this e¤ect and thereby maintain high rates of credit card borrowing and consumption-income
comovement. As a net result of these changes, the over-identifying restrictions are now rejected.
In Column 3, we consider the case ￿ = 6:59%: Flavin and Yamashita (2002) calculate this as
the average real after-tax return to housing, including capital gains, use-value, maintenance costs,
and taxes.34 We view this …gure as falling toward the upper end of a range of possible returns to
the illiquid asset in our model. If our model distinguished between average and marginal returns
we would want to use the marginal return not the average return on housing.35 Moreover, even the
33Our measure of r
CC is constructed from aggregate data, so its true variability is underestimated in the …rst stage.
34Flavin and Yamashita (2002) assume that use-value is equal to the real return on …nancial assets plus housing
depreciation plus property taxes.
35Because of transaction costs, at the margin it may be optimal to pay o¤ the mortgage rather than buying a larger
house. The marginal return to paying o¤ a mortgage is 3.38% as we argue above.
19average return to housing may be lower than 6.59% because of transaction costs of buying/selling
real estate.
Using ￿ = 6:59% we obtain a higher estimate of ^ ￿ and a lower estimate for ^ ￿ than in the bench-
mark case. As ￿ approaches the credit card interest rate, the model can more easily accommodate
simultaneous illiquid wealth accumulation and credit card borrowing. Despite the increased esti-
mate for ^ ￿; the ￿ = 1 hypothesis is still rejected at the 99% con…dence level. We also report a
borderline rejection of the over-identifying restrictions for this case.
The large e¤ects resulting from changes in ￿ contrast with the small e¤ects we now report
arising from changes in the credit card real interest rate, rCC: In Column 4 we assume rCC = 10%
and …nd that ^ ￿ rises and ^ ￿ falls relative to the benchmark case. Column 5 shows similar e¤ects in
the opposite direction for rCC = 13%: We introduce these perturbations for two reasons. First,
formal incorporation of uncertainty in rCC through the …rst stage correction only accounts for
variation in population average interest rates. Additional tests in Columns 4 and 5 could capture
individual-level variation. In addition, these changes correspond to di¤erent perspectives on how
bankruptcy matters for the cost of credit card borrowing. Our benchmark value for rCC equals the
debt-weighted average interest rate from the Fed, minus in‡ation, minus the personal bankruptcy
rate. This ignores the fact (i) that the marginal utility of consumption may be especially high
in the bankruptcy state, and that households may default without declaring bankruptcy, implying
that our correction is too small, and (ii) that bankruptcy carries stigma (Gross and Souleles 2002b),
implying that our correction is too large. We favor the middle speci…cation as our benchmark,
and note that changes in rCC of about 150 basis points reported in Columns 4 and 5 have little
quantitative e¤ect on the time preference estimates. However, these perturbations do lead to a
rejection of the overidentifying restrictions.
In the bottom panel of the table we estimate the model with the restriction ￿ = 1: In every
case, the restricted model is rejected by the overidenti…cation test.36
36In columns 2 and 3, the exponential results are nearly identical to the benchmark case; the point estimates do not
di¤er at all. This occurs because simulated exponential households accumulate zero illiquid wealth at the estimated
^ ￿ in both the benchmark case and in the perturbed cases.
205.3.2 The coe¢cient of relative risk aversion
We next examine the e¤ect of varying the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion ￿: Economists disagree
about how to calibrate ￿: In order to account for the equity premium puzzle, the consumption
CAPM requires ￿ > 10 (Kocherlakota 1996). But most lifecycle consumption models assume ￿ 2
[0:5; 5]; consistent with typical introspective choices about hypothetical large gambles (Mankiw and
Zeldes 1991). Using a structural approach, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) identify ￿ from lifecycle
consumption pro…les. For di¤erent speci…cations they …nd ￿ between 0.1 and 5.3, with a benchmark
estimate of 0.51. When liquidity constraints do not bind and preferences are time-separable, ￿
is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Euler Equation estimates of this
elasticity range roughly between 0 and 1 (Hall 1988). Further complicating the picture, recent
theoretical work casts doubt on the prevailing approach to modeling risk attitudes. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and others propose and use models of loss aversion that imply …rst-order risk
aversion. Rabin (2000) argues that seemingly-reasonable attitudes toward small gambles imply
totally unreasonable attitudes toward larger gambles in an expected utility model with second-order
risk aversion. Chetty (2004) proposes that consumption commitments could cause di¤erent local
and global levels of risk aversion.
Recall that we adopted ￿ = 2 for our benchmark. We now examine the e¤ect of adopting ￿ = 1
and ￿ = 3: Column 1 of Table 4B reports the e¤ect of assuming ￿ = 1: We …nd that ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ both
rise relative to their benchmark estimates. With less curvature in the utility function consumers
are more willing to consume early in life and retire in relative poverty (and thereby more willing to
borrow on their credit cards and less willing to accumulate assets). Raising ￿ and ￿ o¤sets these
e¤ects. In this speci…cation, ^ ￿ is only marginally signi…cantly di¤erent from 1. Finally, assuming
￿ = 1 generates a rejection of the overidentifying restrictions.
Column 3 of Table 4B reports the e¤ect of assuming ￿ = 3: As one would predict from the
previous experiment, we now …nd that ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ both fall relative to their benchmark estimates. As
a result the null hypothesis of ￿ = 1 is rejected with a t-statistic of 3.2. Finally, assuming ￿ = 3
does not lead to a rejection of the overidentifying restrictions. It is not clear what larger values
of ￿ would imply, though the gradient that we observe in our simulations suggests that raising the
value of ￿ lowers the estimated value of ￿:
21Given the sensitivity of the model’s quantitative results to the assumed value of ￿; we also
estimate ￿ simultaneously with ￿ and ￿: The results are reported in Column 4 of Table 4B. In
this case, ￿; ￿; and ￿ are all precisely identi…ed. We …nd ^ ￿ = 0:220 with a standard error of 0.066.
The model wants a low value of ￿; since the empirical moments reveal very little precautionary
savings – i.e. savings in liquid form. Recall that credit card borrowing re‡ects a decumulation of
liquid wealth.
At the estimated, low value of ￿; the short-run discount factor ^ ￿ rises, but ^ ￿ is still signi…cantly
below unity. Higher short-term impatience is still needed to reproduce both the wealth and credit
card moments. When ￿ is estimated, the standard errors on ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ fall. Goodness-of-…t improves
substantially and the overidenti…cation test is not rejected.
The lower half of Column 4 reports simultaneous estimates of ￿ and ￿; holding ￿ …xed at 1.
The resulting estimate of ^ ￿ is again very low. The estimate is imprecise, and risk neutrality is not
rejected. To interpret this, recall that when (exponential) discounting is su¢cient to match the
credit card moments, lifecycle accumulation is minimal.
Similar results from optimally weighted estimation with ￿ are reported in Column 5 of Table
4B.
5.3.3 Returns to Scale in Household Size
The household utility function depends on the number of people in the household and the intra-
household returns to scale. In the benchmark case, we assume that the e¤ective household size nt
at time t equals two spouses, plus the number of adult dependents, plus 0.4 times the number of
child dependents.
In this subsection we analyze two modi…cations to these assumptions. First, we implement
the “square root scale,” (Ruggles 1990, Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding 1995), in which period






1￿￿ , where Nt is the total number of people in the
household. This formulation treats household heads, child dependents, and adult dependents
symmetrically, but still captures returns to scale since the square root function is concave. The
e¤ect of this change is reported in Column 6 of Table 4A. In the quasi-hyperbolic case, we …nd
that ￿ falls slightly, ￿ rises slightly, and goodness of …t worsens slightly. The overidenti…cation test
22fails at the 5% level. In the exponential case, ￿ rises slightly.
Second, we study a “partial individual mortality” assumption. In the benchmark case mortality
occurs at the level of the household, so the two household heads die simultaneously.37 In contrast,
under partial individual mortality we incorporate individual mortality directly into nt.38 We
assume that utility depends continuously on the expected number of heads that remain alive until
age 84, at which point the expected number of surviving heads falls below 1. After age 84, under
partial individual mortality, we retain our original assumption that mortality is a discrete event.
This change generates the estimates in Column 7 of Table 4A. Relative to the benchmark, ￿ falls
and ￿ rises. Now the overidenti…cation restrictions are rejected.
5.3.4 Compound Cases
We also consider four “compound cases” to evaluate the consequences of letting ￿; rCC; ￿; and
intrahousehold returns to scale reinforce each other. In Case A, we consider the e¤ect of simulta-
neously assuming ￿ = 3:38%; rCC = 13%; and ￿ = 3; in Case B we assume ￿ = 6:59%, rCC = 10%;
and ￿ = 1; in Case C we assume ￿ = 3:38%; rCC = 13%; ￿ = 5, the square root scale, and
“individual mortality;” and in Case D we assume ￿ = 6:59%, rCC = 10%; and ￿ = 0:2196.
Case A combines three perturbations of …rst stage parameters that we discussed and reported
above. In isolation, each of those perturbations lowers the estimates of ￿: In Column 6 of Table
4B we report that their combined e¤ect results in estimates of ^ ￿ = 0:375 and ^ ￿ = 0:972. When
we restrict ￿ to equal 1 (Column 6) we estimate ^ ￿ = 0:770: With such a low ^ ￿; the exponential
discounting model predicts credit card borrowing and excess sensitivity quite well, but predicts
approximately no wealth accumulation.
In Case B we combine the three perturbations that are opposite to those in Case A, and we
estimate ^ ￿ = 0:908 and ^ ￿ = 0:943 (Column 7 of Table 4B). This estimate carries a small standard
error, implying that even under aggressive assumptions about ￿; rCC; and ￿, we still …nd that ^ ￿ is
signi…cantly less than 1.
37This assumption induces two o¤-setting biases (Laibson et al. 2003). First, it rules out partial intra-household
longevity insurance through independent mortality outcomes. Second, it does not account for the rise in per-capita
consumption needs when one of the two household heads dies.
38For comparability to our benchmark case, we use our benchmark assumptions about returns to scale in the
household, in contrast to the square root scale.
23The third compound case, Case C, combines all the perturbations discussed above that have
decreased ^ ￿; and also assumes ￿ = 5: Now, reported in Column 8, we obtain ^ ￿ = 0:178 and
^ ￿ = 0:997: Goodness-of-…t worsens, and the overidenti…cation test is rejected.
Finally, in Case D we adopt ￿ = 0:2196–the value of ￿ we obtained when estimating ￿; ￿;
and ￿ simultaneously–and we also assume ￿ = 6:59% and rCC = 10%. As expected, this is the
combination of assumptions that pushes ￿ closest to 1. We …nd ^ ￿ = 0:947 and ^ ￿ = 0:946: However,
the standard error on ^ ￿ has shrunk, as in Case B and in the simultaneous estimation of ￿; ￿; and ￿
reported above, so even in this case the ￿ = 1 null hypothesis is rejected with a t-statistic of 3.31.
In the bottom half of Columns 6-9 we report estimates in the compound cases for the restricted
exponential model and …nd that ^ ￿ ranges from 0.620 to 0.936: Case B is the most successful case for
the exponential model among all of the simulations that we perform. Nevertheless, this simulation
also rejects the overidenti…cation restrictions.
6 Extensions
This paper’s …ndings suggest several directions for future work.
6.1 Naivete
Strotz (1955), Akerlof (1991) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b) propose that decision
makers with dynamically inconsistent preferences make current choices under the “naive” belief
that later selves will act in the interests of the current self. Angeletos et al. (2001) …nd that
naive and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic agents behave similarly in consumption models like the
one discussed in this paper.
However, two puzzles remain that perhaps a model of naivete could address. First, the sophis-
ticated quasi-hyperbolics in these simulations would be better o¤ if they had no access to credit
cards. Speci…cally, according to a comparison of value functions, at age 20, sophisticated quasi-
hyperbolics would be willing to pay $2000 to get rid of their credit cards immediately and never
have access to them in the future. This begs the question of why only a tiny fraction of consumers
cut up their credit cards.
Second, the spread between the cost of funds and the credit card interest rate is “too high.”
24As Ausubel (1991) has pointed out, the spread cannot be accounted for by standard explanations
like default probabilities; instead consumers seem to pick their credit card under the naive belief
that they will not borrow in the future. Teaser rates may also be explained by a model of naive
quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Shui and Ausubel 2004).39
6.2 Further generalization of intertemporal preferences
Standard models study the one-parameter exponential discount function, and we have explored a
two-parameter generalization. We may …nd that richer representations better describe discounting
patterns. It is also possible that the nature of discounting changes over the course of the lifecycle,40
providing another possible framework for explaining patterns of wealth accumulation and credit
card borrowing.
6.3 Heterogeneity
Another important direction for future work is to relax the assumption of homogeneous preferences.
Speci…cally, one might wonder whether two groups of exponential consumers, one patient and the
other impatient, could account for the facts. To us, the data suggest that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the population, but that the heterogeneity does not explain why the median
household both borrows on its credit cards and invests in illiquid assets. Laibson et al. (2003) …nd
that credit card borrowing is pervasive across the entire wealth distribution. Nevertheless, a model
with heterogeneous preferences may resolve some of the empirical tensions discussed in this paper.
Interest rate heterogeneity might also explain the lifecycle wealth accumulation and credit card
borrowing facts. A model of exponential consumers facing sharply di¤erent interest rates could
simultaneously match the frequencies of credit card borrowing and the levels of midlife wealth
accumulation. But actual interest rates paid on credit cards do not correlate with wealth holdings.
Households surveyed in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances were asked about the interest rate
they paid on their credit cards. Households in the top quartile of the distribution of wealth reported
an average nominal rate of 13.27%, whereas households in the lowest quartile of wealth reported an
39See also the theoretical contribution of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004).
40Our assumption that marginal utility varies with demographics (and thus with age) is a special case of the general
class of age-speci…c discounting studied by Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Attanasio et al. (1999).
25average of 13.59%.41 Hence, households with substantial wealth do not face low credit card interest
rates – e.g. teaser rates – that could explain their frequent credit card borrowing.
6.4 Institutional assumptions
The assets in the model are stylized and it would be natural to make our institutional assumptions
more realistic. In a richer model households would be able to declare bankruptcy, default on their
credit card debt, sell their Z assets, borrow against their Z assets, and engage in many other types
of …nancial transactions. We are most interested in exploring changes in assumptions about Z;
since the Z asset plays a central role in driving our results. For example, if the Z asset were
perfectly liquid our model would be unable to explain credit card borrowing (since consumers
with liquid retirement assets would spend down these liquid assets rather than borrowing on a
high-interest credit card). Hence, the illiquidity of Z is critical for the predictive power of the
model. Illiquidity of Z also mimics the optimal mechanisms that have recently been derived for
quasi-hyperbolic consumers (Amador et al. 2004).
Other work has explored the consequences of making Z less illiquid (i.e., by introducing a
transaction cost for liquidating Z).42 This does not change the model’s qualitative predictions.
However, such transaction cost models may be too crude to capture the implications of collateralized
borrowing against Z. For example, home equity lines of credit are rapidly gaining popularity in
the U.S. and such instruments make heretofore illiquid home equity relatively easy to access. If
home equity lines of credit provide immediate liquidity with little or no transactions costs, then
Z is really not an illiquid asset. However, if applying for a home equity line of credit generates
immediate e¤ort costs as well as bureaucratic delays, then quasi-hyperbolic consumers will prefer
to use their credit cards rather than applying for such credit lines (Laibson 1997).
To explore these issues, researchers should develop high frequency models in which the units of
time are days and not years (and ￿ multiplies all utility ‡ows starting tomorrow). In such models
the nature of the e¤ort costs and the bureaucratic delays will play an important role. For example,
if an application for a home equity credit line yields immediate e¤ort costs and only delayed liquidity
41The means refer to high school educated households with outstanding balances on their credit cards.
42Laibson et al. (2003) report simulations in which liquidating part of the illiquid asset generates a …xed cost of
$10,000 and a proportional cost of 10%.
26(say in a week), such credit may not be tempting to quasi-hyperbolic consumers. However, if a
home equity application has vanishingly small e¤ort costs and yields immediate liquidity, then
such a loan will be appealing to quasi-hyperbolic consumers and the model will then predict that
splurges will not be funded from credit cards.
Such high frequency models are beyond the scope of the current paper. As home equity
lines of credit and other technologies for making illiquid assets liquid become increasingly popular
(only 7.8% of homeowners in the 1998 SCF had such loans), it will become more important for
economists to study the micro-structure and micro-timing of the loan application process. Though
the parameters of this paper’s model are identi…ed o¤ data from a time period when home equity
was more illiquid than today, if consumers sharply devalue rewards that are delayed by only a few
days, models of the credit application process will need to re‡ect these high frequency preferences.
6.5 Consumption shocks
In addition to income uncertainty, consumers also face stochastic shocks to preferences and con-
sumption needs (Amador et al. 2004). Expenses for car repairs and health care, for example, often
come unexpectedly. In principle this additional volatility could generate higher levels of (illiquid)
wealth accumulation and credit card borrowing by promoting saving after unusually good shocks
and borrowing after unusually bad shocks. We examine this possibility qualitatively by proxying
for consumption shocks with increased income uncertainty. Speci…cally, we re-estimate ￿ and ￿ af-
ter doubling the variances of the parameters of our calibrated income process.43 This yields results
very similar to the benchmark run discussed above: the estimate of ￿, 0.62, is signi…cantly less
than 1; the speci…cation test on the quasi-hyperbolic model is borderline; and the speci…cation test
on the exponential model, when ￿ is restricted to equal 1, is rejected. Though these results support
the intuition that volatility can not explain why the same time-consistent consumers would both
accumulate illiquid assets and borrow on credit cards, subsequent analyses might formally calibrate
and incorporate stochastic shocks to the marginal utility of consumption.
43We consider this a plausible upper bound, as it increases the conditional and unconditional standard deviations
of income by about 50%. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) and Palumbo (1999) estimate dynamic processes of
health expenditures, …nding conditional and unconditional standard deviations equivalent to roughly one-third and
one-…fth, respectively, of the conditional and unconditional standard deviations in income that we document in the
PSID.
276.6 Second stage moment sets
As is well known from GMM theory, the choice of moments can be crucial to the outcome of the
analysis. We chose to focus on the four moments discussed above: % visa; mean visa; CY; wealth.
We could have matched other moments, including the wealth-to-income ratio at ages other than
the pre-retirement age that we study; or the consumption-to-income ratio at various points in the
lifecycle; or the proportion of homeowners; or the fraction of wealth that is illiquid; and so on.
If our model is correctly speci…ed, analyzing di¤erent moments should not change our estimated
parameter values. Hence, analyzing di¤erent moments is a potential test of our model and a
priority for future research.
Data on synthetic cohort consumption pro…les are used by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) to
estimate a long-term discount factor of 0.949 (0.015) for their high-school-graduate group. We
believe that low-frequency lifecycle dynamics for average consumption are a good way to identify
long-run discount rates. Wealth accumulation provides an alternative strategy to identify long-run
discount rates. These di¤erent estimation strategies are likely to produce similar results, since the
wealth-based strategy we adopt generates simulations that exhibit the hump-shaped consumption
pro…les used by Gourinchas and Parker (2002).44 Nevertheless, it would be useful to integrate both
sets of moments in a single estimation exercise. The calibrated quasi-hyperbolic model predicts a
transitory consumption boom when credit cards are …rst acquired. One could empirically test this
prediction.
Illiquidity of investments provides another source of identifying data (Angeletos et al 2001).
Households invest very little of their wealth in liquid form. Even with an expansive de…nition
of liquid assets, only 18:6% of total US household wealth is liquid.45 Illiquidity may help to
explain several puzzles involving consumption during retirement, including the measured pattern
of anomalously slow decumulation of assets.
44See Angeletos et al. (2001) for simulations of lifecycle consumption.
45The methodology for calculating the share is analogous to that for calculating % V isa; mean V isa; and wealth
described in Appendix A. The de…nition includes cash, checking and savings accounts, money market accounts, call
accounts, CDs, bonds, stocks and mutual funds.
286.7 Policy experiments
Extensions of our structural model can be used to analyze public policies, including bankruptcy
laws, credit card regulations, social insurance systems, and pensions policies (e.g., forced savings,
automatic enrollment, annuitization, etc.). The positive and normative consequences of such poli-
cies can be analyzed by incorporating these policies into our structural model. With estimates in
hand, out-of-sample predictions are possible.
7 Conclusion
This paper estimates time preferences using a structural model and …eld data. U.S. households
accumulate large stocks of wealth before retirement, borrow actively on credit cards, and exhibit
excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable movements in income. To explain these phenomena
the MSM procedure estimates ￿ = 0:703 and ￿ = 0:958: Intuitively, the implied low long-term
discount rate (￿ln￿ = 4:3%) accounts for observed levels of (illiquid) wealth accumulation. The
high short-term discount rate (￿ln￿￿ = 39:5%) explains the observed frequency and levels of credit
card borrowing and excess sensitivity of consumption. Our benchmark speci…cation fails to reject
the overidenti…cation restrictions. The MSM procedure does reject the restriction to exponential
discounting (￿ = 1).
Our parameter estimates are sensitive to the calibration choices, and some calibrations lead
to a failure of the overidenti…cation tests. In addition, our economic environment is stylized
and future work should enrich the realism of our modelling framework. However, the evidence
reported here suggests that consumption-savings models will better match …eld data when the
models incorporate discount rates in the short run that exceed discount rates at longer horizons.
Structural estimation using …eld data is likely to be a useful complement to laboratory studies that
measure time preferences.
29A Second-Stage Moments Appendix
We now discuss the procedures we use to construct the second-stage moments. We use the SCF
to derive wealth, % V isa and mean V isa, and the PSID to construct CY . Procedures are very
similar for the share of liquid assets. All quantities are de‡ated to 1990 dollars.
A.1 SCF Moments
We use the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 SCFs to compute the wealth moment. We derive
% V isa and mean V isa from the 1995 and 1998 SCFs. We control for cohort e¤ects, household
demographics, and business cycle e¤ects to make the characteristics of the population and the
simulated data fully analogous. We assign to households in our simulations the mean empirical
cohort, demographic, and business cycle e¤ects. We adopt the following procedures.
For each variable of interest x we …rst use weighted least squares, applying the SCF population
weights that match our sample selections, to estimate
xi = FEi + BCEi + CEi + AEi + ￿i (8)
Here FEi is a family size e¤ect that consists of three variables, the number of heads, the number
of children, and the number of dependent adults in the household. BCEi is a business cycle
e¤ect proxied by the unemployment rate in the household’s region of residence. In 1983, the
unemployment rate is the rate in the state of residence. In 1992, 1995, and 1998, it is the rate
in the Census Division. In 1989 the nationwide rate was used because information on household
location is not available in the public use data set. CEi is a cohort e¤ect that consists of a full set
of …ve-year cohort dummies, AEi is an age e¤ect that consists of a full set of age dummies, and ￿i
is an error term.46
Next, we de…ne the “typical” household to be identical to the simulated household (i.e. with
head and spouse, exogenous age-varying numbers of children and adult dependents, an average
cohort e¤ect, and an average unemployment e¤ect47). Then for each variable we create a new
46Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002) we attribute time e¤ects to ‡uctuations in unemployment, but this
approach–like any approach to separating age, cohort, and time e¤ects–requires problematic identi…cation assump-
tions. Deaton (1997) discusses other imperfect alternatives.
47These averages are the means used in the calibration of the income process, which is based on the PSID. Refer
30variable b xi that captures what xi would have been had household i been typical. For example,
if household i is identical to the “typical” household except for having more children, we set
b xi = xi + ￿(nkids ￿ nkidsi), where ￿ is the coe¢cient for number of kids in the regression above
and nkids is the average number of children in a household as a function of the head’s age. All
moments were estimated using b xi.
For wealth, we restrict the sample to households with heads between ages 50-59. We include all
real and …nancial wealth (e.g., home equity and CDs) as well as all claims on de…ned contribution
pension plans (e.g., 401(k)). The measure does not include Social Security wealth and claims
on de…ned bene…t pension plans, since these ‡ows appear in our estimated income process. If a
household had a negative net balance in any illiquid asset, we set the balance equal to zero (e.g.,
we set home equity equal to the max of 0 and the value of home minus outstanding mortgages
minus used portion of home equity lines of credit). Since there is no separate information on the
amount borrowed against home equity lines of credit in the 1983 SCF, we assume that in that year
no household had an outstanding home equity line balance.48
Let ￿ = 10 ￿ 2





in the sample, applying the SCF
population weights. We use this arctan scaling in order to downweight outliers. This function
has noteworthy properties. First, it is symmetric around the origin. Second, it is approximately
linear in a neighborhood of the origin. Third, as b xi gets very large, it asymptotes to 10. We






To construct % V isa we create a dummy variable hasdebt equal to one for household i if i has
a positive outstanding credit card balance in the SCF. We correct hasdebt to generate b xi. We
then regress b xi on a full set of age dummies. % V isa is a linear combination of the estimated
coe¢cients on the age dummies, where the weights are derived from the same conditional survival
probabilities we use in the simulations. The standard error is computed directly from the weights
and the standard errors on the age dummy estimates.
Construction of mean V isa is complicated by the fact that aggregate credit card borrowing
data from the Fed indicate that 1995 and 1998 SCF borrowing magnitudes are biased downward
to Table 3 and Laibson et al. (2003) for details.
48In the 1983 SCF, 1:7% of homeowners with a high school degree reported having a credit line secured by home
equity.
31by a factor of three. We correct for this bias as follows. First we compute average outstanding
interest-bearing balances. According to the Fed, aggregate debt outstanding at year-end 1995 and
1998 were $443 billion and $561 billion, respectively. From these …gures we subtract an upper
bound on the ‡oat (the balances that are still in their one-month grace period, which do not accrue
interest). This upper bound is obtained by dividing total purchase volume, approximately $1
trillion in 1998, by 12. We then divide by the number of U.S. households with credit cards, using
Census Bureau data on total households and SCF data on the percentage of households with cards.
We obtain average household borrowing conditional on having a card of $5115 in 1995 and $6411
in 1998. These …gures are consistent with those from a proprietary account-level data set analyzed
by Gross and Souleles (2002a, 2002b).
In our simulations we focus on households headed by people with high school degrees, so next
we use the SCF data on borrowing to scale the Fed average borrowing …gure for just the high school
educated group. In particular, we de…ne ￿ such that
debtFed




with weights wnhs, whs, and wcoll de…ned by the proportion of educational categories in the pop-
ulation (0.25, 0.5, 0.25, respectively) and debtsource
educ equal to the average debt reported by source
for educational group educ. Focusing now exclusively on the HS educational group, let debtSCF
i
be the level of credit card debt reported in the SCF for household i. Let debti = ￿ ￿ debtSCF
i be
the corrected credit card debt. Calculate age speci…c income means (yt) and create debtinci as
debti=y 49. Then, we correct debtinci, creating b xi, and regress b xi on a full set of age dummies.
The moment mean V isa is a linear combination of the estimated coe¢cients on the age dummies,
again using the weights derived from the conditional survival probabilities used in the simulations.
Again, the standard error is computed directly from the weights and the standard errors on the
age dummy estimates.
Covariances between the SCF moments were constructed by jointly estimating the above means.
49When calculating the age-speci…c income means we group together ages 20-21, 70-74, 75-79, and 80 and over
because we have very few observations at those ages.
32A.2 PSID Moment
We use PSID data from 1978 to 1992 to estimate the CY moment. In the data, we de…ne
consumption to include food, rent, and utilities (the most general de…nition available in the PSID).
The rental value of an owner-occupied home is assumed to be 5% of the value of the home. If
the household neither owns nor rents, rent is the self-reported rental value of the home if it were
rented.
We construct the CY moment by using 2SLS to estimate
￿ln(Cit) = ￿Et￿1￿ln(Yit) + Xit￿ + "it;
where Cit is just food, rent, and utilities.50 We assume an MA(1) process for the error term and
instrument for Et￿1￿ln(Yit) with lnYit￿3 and lnYit￿4. The instruments are jointly sgni…cant in
the …rst stage regression, and the overidenti…cation test does not reject the speci…cation. The
vector Xit includes age, cohort, and business cycle e¤ects, the change in e¤ective family size, the
mortality rate, and lagged wealth.51 Since wealth is observed in the PSID only in 1984 and 1989,
in the other years we estimate wealth using the intertemporal budget constraint and a projected
value of total consumption. Total consumption was projected from the PSID’s partial measure
using the CEX: in the CEX we regress total consumption on food, rent and utilities consumption,
and then we use the coe¢cients to infer total consumption from the available PSID measure.
B MSM Procedure Appendix
Since m(￿; b ￿) is di¢cult to evaluate we replace it with an unbiased simulator, calculated by …rst
taking Js draws of the initial distribution and then constructing the corresponding simulated ex-
50Unfortunately, the PSID contains limited information on consumption. Our CY measure may be sensitive to
the de…nition of consumption. Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Dynarski and Gruber (1997) report a lower
sensitivity of food and housing expenditures than of total consumption to changes in the earnings of the head of
the household. Hence, the comovement moment that we use in our analysis is biased down, which implies that our
estimate of ￿ is probably (slightly) biased up, since low ￿ values generate more comovement. We conjecture that this
bias in ￿ is slight because the comovement moment has a minimal impact on our estimates due to the high standard
errors that are associated with that moment.
51The wealth variable turned out to be signi…cant at a 6% level. Its exclusion does not a¤ect the estimate of CY,
which slightly rises from 0.2311 to 0.2314.
33pectations. De…ne mJs (￿; b ￿) as the vector of simulated moments. Now we can …nd the vector b ￿
that minimizes g0
Js (￿; b ￿)WgJs (￿; b ￿), where gJs (￿; b ￿) = ￿ mJm ￿ mJs (￿; b ￿).
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q
^ JmgJs￿ (￿0;￿0)(b ￿ ￿ ￿0)
￿
: (9)
To evaluate Equation 9, …rst note that
q
^ JmgJs (￿0;￿0) =
q
^ Jm [￿ mJm ￿ mJs (￿0;￿0)]
=
q
^ Jm [￿ mJm ￿ m(￿0;￿0)] +
q
^ Jm [m(￿0;￿0) ￿ mJs (￿0;￿0)]
The two bracketed terms represent independent sets of draws from the same population. The
…rst term equals
p
^ Jmg (￿0;￿0); which is asymptotically normally distributed:
p
^ Jmg (￿0;￿0) !






directly from its sample counterpart.52
The second term represents the simulation error. At the true value of ￿; the simulated moments
were generated from a …nite number of random draws from the true population. Therefore, the
52In fact, the (a;b)’th cell is ￿g (a;b) =
￿g(a;b)
min(Jma;Jmb):
34second term is also asymptotically normal (as the size of the simulated sample goes to in…nity)
with mean 0 and variance ^ Jm
￿g
Js . Finally, since variation in the simulation and the data are
independent,
p










: To operationalize this expression for the
variance, given the di¤erent numbers of observations Jm in the sample, we conservatively use the
pairwise maximum numbers of observations, max(Jma;Jmb); to weight the (a;b)’th cell of ￿g in
the simulation correction:
Now turn to the second term of Equation 9. In the main text we have de…ned the variance of
the …rst stage parameter estimates b ￿ as ￿￿ = E
￿
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by the asymptotic normality of b ￿ and g (￿) and by the Slutsky theorem, assuming zero covariance
between the …rst and second stage moments. Dividing by ^ Jm we obtain our key equation,




















Standard errors reported in the text and tables equal the square roots of the diagonal elements of
￿￿:
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Description and Name 
m J m   se(
m J m ) 
% Borrowing on Visa:     “% Visa”  0.678  0.015 
     
Mean (Borrowingt / mean(Incomet)):   “mean Visa”  0.117  0.009 
     
Consumption-Income Comovement:    “CY”  0.231  0.112 




:     “wealth”  2.60  0.13 
     
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
the Federal Reserve, and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics.  Calculations pertain 
to households with heads who have high school diplomas but not college degrees.  The 
variables are defined as follows:  % Visa is the fraction of U.S. households borrowing 
and paying interest on credit cards (SCF 1995 and 1998); mean Visa is the average 
amount of credit card debt as a fraction of the mean income for the age group (SCF 
1995  and  1998,  weighted  by  Fed  aggregates);  CY  is  the  marginal  propensity  to 
consume  out  of  anticipated  changes  in  income  (PSID  1978-92);  and  wealth  is  the 
weighted average wealth-to-income ratio for households with heads aged 50-59 (SCF 
1983-1998).   
TABLE 2 
FIRST STAGE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Demographics             Liquid assets and noncollateralized debt 
  Number of children           Credit limit λ     
  k= β0*exp(β1*age-β2*(age
2)/100)+ε       0.318       
              (0.017)       
  β0  β1  β2                
  0.006  0.324  0.005         Return on positive liquid assets R 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.007)         1.0279       
               (0.024)       
  Number of dependent adults                
  a= β0*exp(β1*age-β2*(age
2)/100)+ε       Credit card interest rate R
cc   
               1.1152       
  β0  β1  β2         (0.009)       
  8.0e-9  0.727  0.007                
   (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.016)                      
Illiquid Assets            Preference Parameter   
  Consumption flow as a fraction of assets γ      Coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ 
  0.05             2       
  -             -       
Income from transfers and wages                      
  Income process - In the labor force             






t = ηt + υt = αηt-1 + εt + υt               
                     
  β0  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5  β6  α  σ
2
ε   σ
2
υ 
  7.439  0.118  -0.201  0.081  0.548  -0.033  0.170  0.782  0.029  0.026 
  (0.340)  (0.021)  (0.050)  (0.035)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
                     
  Income Process - Retired          Retirement age T   
  y = ln(Y) = β0+β1*age+β2*Nheads+β3*Nchildren+β4*Ndep.adults+ξ
R  63     
                (0.730)     
  β0  β1  β2  β3  β4  σ
2
ξ
R          
  8.433  -0.002  0.554  0.199  0.204  0.051         
  (0.849)  (0.013)  (0.084)  (0.172)  (0.102)  (0.013)         
                                
Source: Authors’ estimation, exactly following Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003), based on data from the 
PSID, SCF, FRB, and American Bankruptcy Institute, for households with heads who have high school diplomas 
but not college degrees. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The constant of the deterministic component of income includes 
a year of birth cohort effect and a business cycle effect proxied by the unemployment rate.   
The dynamics of income estimation includes a household fixed effect.         
Illiquid asset consumption flows and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are assumed to be exactly known in 
the context of the first stage.  We examine sensitivity to these parameters in Subsection 5.3 on Robustness. 
This table only reports standard errors, but the full covariance matrix is used in the second-stage estimation.  
TABLE 3 
BENCHMARK STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION RESULTS 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   





Parameter estimates θ ˆ           
  β ˆ   0.7031  1.0000  0.7150  1.0000  - 
  s.e. (i)  (0.1093)  -  (0.0948)  -  - 
  s.e. (ii)  (0.1090)  -  -  -  - 
  s.e. (iii)  (0.0170)  -  -  -  - 
  s.e. (iv)  (0.0150)  -  -  -  - 
  δˆ   0.9580  0.8459  0.9603  0.9419  - 
  s.e. (i)  (0.0068)  (0.0249)  (0.0081)  (0.0132)  - 
  s.e. (ii)  (0.0068)  (0.0247)  -  -  - 
  s.e. (iii)  (0.0010)  (0.0062)  -  -  - 
  s.e. (iv)  (0.0009)  (0.0056)  -  -  - 
Second-stage moments           
  % Visa  0.634  0.669  0.613  0.284  0.678 
             
  mean Visa  0.167  0.150  0.159  0.049  0.117 
             
  CY  0.314  0.293  0.269  0.074  0.231 
             
  wealth  2.69  -0.05  3.22  2.81  2.60 
             
Goodness-of-fit           
  ) ˆ , ˆ ( χ θ q   67.2  436  2.48  34.4  - 
  ) ˆ , ˆ ( χ θ ξ   3.01  217  8.91  258.7  - 
  p-value  0.222  <1e-10  0.0116  <2e-7  - 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
Note on standard errors:  (i) includes both the first stage correction and the simulation 
correction, (ii) includes just the first stage correction, (iii) includes just the simulation 
correction, and (iv) includes neither correction. 
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